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Abstract 
There are still severe inequalities in presentday democratic South Africa; this is no secret. 
The ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor also contributes to increasing 
disparities of access to health care and medical treatment, as well as the ability to afford 
them. Human genetic engineering (HGE) is fast becoming an everyday reality and, though 
it is not forecast to become commercially available in South Africa very soon and many of 
the promised benefits are still very far in the future, anticipatory reflection is needed. This  
article considers just one of the challenges that HGE poses to Christian ethics within the 
South African context and its inequalities, especially with regards to health care, as part of 
the discourse of human dignity and human rights. 
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Introduction 
With the development and continued developing of medical technology, treatments become 
available without the time to reflect ethically on them. Human genetic engineering (HGE) 
is fast becoming an everyday reality and poses a myriad of ethical questions, especially to 
the field of theological ethics, for it deals closely with theological concepts such as 
creation; particular perspectives on God as Creator; perspectives on human beings as 
created beings; human beings created in the image of God; human dignity; and human 
creativity. Even in secular discourse, the phrase often used in ethical discussion on HGE is 
‘playing God’2. 
This article examines the ethical issues that the impending availability of HGE3 pose in 
presentday South Africa and its inequalities, especially with regards to health care as a 
human right as part of the discourse on human dignity. In the first section of this paper, the 
health care inequalities that exist in presentday South Africa will be outlined briefly. In the 
second section, the question whether health care could be viewed as a human right will be 
                                                
1  This article was first presented as a paper at the Theological Society of South Africa “Land, Liturgy and Life” 
Conference held 19-21 June 2013 at the University of the Western Cape.  
2  For further discussion on this phrase and its implications, see, for example, Jonathan Glover (2006:63); 
Thomas Shannon (2000:75-76); Audrey Chapman (1999:52-57) and Ted Peters (1998:8-13). 
3  Although the ethical implications and issues raised by the genetic engineering of human beings are numerous 
and diverse, this article will be focusing only on one aspect, namely the matter of access and social justice 
within the South African context with its inequalities. 
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discussed and in the third section, health care within the context of HGE will be brought 
into conversation with the human dignity discourse. 
 
Health Care Inequalities in the South African Context 
It is known widely that even in presentday, democratic South Africa there are still severe 
inequalities. The ever-widening gap between the rich and the poor also contributes to 
increasing disparities with regard to service delivery and access to health care and medical 
treatment, as well as the ability to afford it. 
Section 21(1)(a) of the South African Constitution states that everyone has the right of 
access to health care within available resources, whilst Section 28(1)(c) grants all children 
the right to basic health care services. The International Bill of Rights recognises justice 
and fairness, and provides that the law should prohibit any discrimination on any grounds. 
Although these rights are guaranteed, it is also clear that this does not mirror the reality. 
It is common knowledge that under the apartheid government racial discrimination 
affected the health of Black, Coloured and Indian people and that the inheritance and legacy 
of this discrimination contributes to continued discrepancy between the services that South 
Africans of different races are able to access, which includes health care services. Adila in 
Health and Democracy: A guide to human rights, health law and policy in post-apartheid 
South Africa, attributes this discrimination also to social conditions that resulted in ill 
health, the segregation of health facilities, unequal spending on health services and the 
failure of professional medical bodies and civil society to challenge the way that health care 
was managed under apartheid. The first truly democratic government in South Africa, 
elected in 1994, inherited various disparities at the level of health care, such as racial, 
geographic and public versus private inequalities (2007:11-16). As Sampie Terreblanche 
states further in A History of Inequality in South Africa: 1652-2002, since 1994, “a 
continuation of unequal power relations, unfree labour patterns, and uneven socio-
economic development” is seen (2002:20). He elaborates: 
The democratic government that assumed power in 1994 inherited a rather contradictory 
legacy. On the one hand, it inherited the most developed economy in Africa, with a 
modern physical and institutional infrastructure. On the other, it inherited major socio-
economic problems, including high levels of unemployment; the abject poverty of 50 
percent of the population; sharp inequalities in the distribution of income, property, and 
opportunities; and high levels of crime and violence. What makes these problems much 
more pressing is the fact that it is mainly black South Africans – and particularly 
Africans – who are at their receiving end (Terreblanche 2002:4). 
In 2002, the South African government claimed that between 1994 and 2002, 9 million 
people, who had not had access previously, had been given access to clean water, and 1.5 
million households to electricity. Telephone connections had been provided to 1.3 million 
households, 1 million houses had been built for those who had previously had no formal 
shelter, free medical services had been provided to expectant mothers and children younger 
than seven, food programmes had reached 5 million children and rural communities had 
benefitted from infrastructural development (Terreblanche 2002:28). This seems to be an 
encouraging picture, proving that the inequalities of the past are rapidly being eradicated 
and that in just eight short years, the democratic South African government has bridged the 
gap of inequality and taken, not just small steps, but giant leaps down the road to equality 
for all. Terreblanche, however, then dashes this idealistic representation by going on to 
declare:  
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Many of the electricity, water, and telephone connections are cut off every month 
because users cannot afford to pay for them. Many of the houses built are of poor 
quality. In 1999 the department of water affairs admitted that many of its water provision 
projects had fallen into dysfunction or disrepair. The removal of farmers’ subsidies as 
well as labour reforms and droughts in the agricultural sector have led to a decline in 
employment of blacks in this sector from 1,4 million to only 800 000. The improvement 
of health services in rural areas has led to a dramatic drop in the quantity and quality of 
health services in urban areas… (Terreblanche 2002:28). 
Francis Wilson, in Historical Roots of Inequality in South Africa, further indicates that the 
majority of income goes to the top 10% of the South African population and she uses data 
from Leibbrandt, Woollard, Finn and Argent’s 2010 study to prove that the richest 10%, 
who earn more than R400 000 per annum per household, earns more than the other 90% 
combined. In terms of poverty, the bottom 30% of South African households all earn well 
under R20 000 per annum. Around 70% of the country’s population earn only 17% of the 
total income. Adding to these figures are the ‘astronomical levels of unemployment’, where 
depending on the definition, between 25% (when defined narrowly) and 41% (when 
defined inclusively) of South Africans who want to work are unemployed. As Wilson 
contends: “Despite its best intentions, despite every effort to develop the most effective 
policy and despite the firm expectations of its voters, the democratic government of the new 
South Africa has been able to do little to shift the levels of poverty, of unemployment and 
of inequality which it inherited from the apartheid regime in 1994” (2011:2-3).  
It is, however, not the intention of this paper to examine the causes and historical 
development of the inequalities that exist at present in South African society, but rather to 
examine how the current conditions would or would not contribute to the ethical discussion 
surrounding HGE. 
 
The Human Right to Health in the Discussion of Human Genetic Engineering 
In this article I will argue that human beings have an inherent human right to health, rather 
than to health care. This statement does not exclude health care from the dimension of 
health, but rather aims to work with a more encompassing and comprehensive parameter 
than simply the right of access to health care services.  
This does not mean, however, that health care should not be included in the right to 
health, or that governments have any less of a duty to look after the health of its people. On 
the contrary, by viewing the right to health as much more than simply access to health care 
services, I argue that a much more holistic view of human health care is at work – one that 
also calls attention to the other features that contribute to health, such as sanitation, 
housing, diet, and so forth, and appeals to the responsibility of government to look after 
these basic human needs of those who cannot afford to do so themselves. Therefore, the 
notion of access to health care is included, but more than that, access to a life of health and 
dignity in this comprehensive sense is what is emphasised. 
To investigate access to health care services further and give an appraisal of how 
accessible HGE could be to people living in South Africa, taking all of the inequalities 
previously mentioned into account, it is important also to distinguish between health and 
health care and  between the right to health as an element of basic human rights and 
forming part of the discussion on human dignity, and the right to health care. I contend that 
simply arguing, whether as part of the human dignity discourse or not, that people have a 
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human right to health care4 fails to take many of the complexities that accompany health 
into account. Health5 is a concept that has much more far-reaching  associations and 
underlying causes than simply access to a clinic. People with free and unrestricted access to 
the best physicians in the world will not be in good physical shape if they are unable to 
purchase fresh and healthy food. Being treated by several world-acclaimed specialists will 
not make someone get well when they do not have access to clean drinking water and 
hygienic bathroom facilities at home. Being healthy, and having the human right to health, 
then, is about much more than access to health care and medical services. 
In Medicine and Public Health, Ethics and Human Rights, a report for the Hastings 
Centre, Jonathan Mann also points out that the contribution of medicine to health is, in fact, 
limited, citing that only a sixth of gained life expectancy is attributed to medicine and that 
only 10% of preventable premature deaths are associated with a lack of health care 
(1997:7). This same sentiment is echoed by many other researchers, for example Dan 
Brock, who states in Broadening the Bioethics Agenda: “But health care’s impact on both 
health and health inequalities is quite limited; for example, medical care is estimated to 
account for only about one fifth of life expectancy gains in the twentieth century” (Brock 
2000:31). 
It would seem then, that it is rather socio-economic issues than health care access that 
are at stake here, although access to health care undeniably also has a role to play.  
 
A Right to Health Care? 
“To say that there is a right to health care does not imply a right to equal access, a right that 
whatever is available to any shall be available to all” (Fried 1976:29). Regarding the ‘right’ 
to health care access, in the Hastings Centre Report 6 Vol. 1, Equality and Rights in 
Medical Care, Charles Fried also gives an informal definition of what a ‘right’ is, stating 
that it is more than just what is in an individual’s interest or the preferable state of affairs or 
state of being. A right is what someone is entitled to, not just what they would like or prefer 
to have, but what must be had and may be demanded when lacked. This statement, 
however, is problematized when he goes on to state that the right to equality could mean 
that even if someone is not necessarily entitled to something, equality could be interpreted 
to mean that that person should still be able to receive the same as someone else (1976:30). 
This could also mean that the development of new treatments and medicines, which 
would most likely be expensive, may be terminated because of the argument “if we provide 
it to any we must provide it to all, therefore perhaps we should provide it to none” (Fried 
1976:31). John Harris also states that “fairness does not require that I should not try to 
protect myself because others cannot; it does not require that benefits should not be 
provided to any until they can be made available to all” (2007:28).  
                                                
4
  In this article, the term “health care” is used as an adjective to refer to that which relates to health care, and as 
a noun to indicate “the prevention, treatment, and management of illness and the preservation of mental and 
physical well-being through the services offered by the medical and allied health professions” (http://medical-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/health+care accessed on 19 July 2013). 
5
  The term “health” used in this article follows the definition of the World Health Organization, namely the 
“state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” 
(http://www.who.int/about/definition/en/print.html accessed on 19 July 2013).  This is very important for the 
manner in which I view health in this article, ; as encompassing more than simply the absence of disease and 
including socio-economic and social aspects. 
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Additionally, it has also been argued that the only right that can be guaranteed by any 
government is a freedom of action and that health care, as opposed to this, is a service 
offered and not a right. Rather, it could be stated that people have the right to health, which 
would imply that they have the right to be protected from risks or hazards to health that 
would be the actions of others, but not that the government should be under any obligation 
to provide health goods and services. On the other hand, others, such as Tom Beauchamp, 
contend that virtually all major diseases are caused socially, rather than individually. From 
this perspective, the only diseases against which people have a right to be protected are those 
that are brought about by entirely natural causes (Beauchamp & Faden 1979:123-125). 
In any discussion on the right to health care, the distinction should be made between 
negative and positive rights. A negative right would be the freedom to pursue a course of 
action or to enjoy conditions and a positive right the entitlement to acquire goods, 
opportunity or service. Whilst it would seem that the right to health care is purely a positive 
right, if health care is broadened to include certain abstentions from actions that are 
intended as precautionary and protective measures, aspects of negative rights are also 
present (Beauchamp & Faden 1979:120-121). 
This concept of restricting human rights becomes clear when we consider the so-called 
positive rights, which infringe upon the rights of other human beings. If health care is 
viewed as such a right, it would be unacceptable if some people were unable to obtain it 
and the government would be compelled to ensure that every person has access to health 
care, even those who are not financially able to buy it on their own. Given that the 
government’s only means of paying for this service would be taxation, and this taxation, as 
Bradley explains in Positive rights, negative rights and health care, would then provide 
unearned goods to one group and, as Peikoff argues further, would be “an immoral 
infringement of the right of the taxed to keep the fruits of their labour”. He goes on to state 
that a system in which someone has a “right to anything at others’ expense means that they 
become rightless”. Barlow also maintains that something cannot be called a right if its 
provision places an ‘intolerable burden’ on others (Bradley 2010:838).  
By the argument that health care is not a right, it is not claimed that it is good, or even 
fair, for people to be without access to health care. Based upon the previous argument, 
those who cannot afford health care by themselves are forced to rely on voluntary charity. 
The contention is, however, that it is also not good, or fair, to provide the poor with health 
care when it is at the expense of other people’s rights (Bradley 2010:839). Bradley, 
however, then goes on to state that protecting even the negative rights of life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness might require some positive action on the part of citizens – 
possibly through the paying of taxes or submitting themselves to the draft. As Shue puts it, 
“a demand for physical security is not normally a demand simply to be left alone, but a 
demand to be protected against harm”. When referring to the positive rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness, it is expected that the government will do something to protect 
those rights. In his opinion, the clear moral boundary that Peikoff draws around negative 
rights thus disappears, as does his basis for claiming that health care cannot be a right 
(Bradley 2010:839). 
On the other hand, there are many possible objections to this argument, such as 
redistribution and equality of need. In line with Peikoff’s argument, it could be argued that 
whilst everybody’s healthcare needs vary, nobody has a greater need than anybody else for 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, leading to the conclusion that, conceivably, this 
equality of need could exclude health care from the domain of true human rights. 
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Anton van Niekerk also voices the conviction that “care about people’s physical and 
mental health is neither a consumable and therefore marketable commodity” (1993:2). 
Rather, he views health care to be both a moral command and a responsibility (1993:2). 
Bradley’s counter-argument, however, states that in reality, even the preservation and 
continuance of a police force involves a redistribution of wealth; whereas effective law 
enforcement might be an advantage to all – those individuals with no income cannot 
contribute to the tax needed to maintain law enforcement, and as a result, compared with 
their contribution to the tax pool, these individuals are receiving a greater service than 
taxpayers, for not only did they not contribute anything, but seeing as they might well be 
homeless or living in more dangerous areas, they most likely benefit quite a bit more from 
the presence of a good police force than the average, taxpaying citizen. Wealthier indivi-
duals, who have the option of hiring additional, private security, also reduce the value that 
they obtain from law enforcement, but still pay the full tax. Consequently, from the point of 
view of both the wealthy and the poor, the maintenance of negative rights can be redistribu-
tive; thus, redistribution cannot serve as the moral distinction between positive and negative 
rights (2011:839). 
In a rights-based approach to public health, as Elvira Beracochea, Dabney Evans and 
Corey Weinstein make clear in the introduction to Rights-Based Approaches to Public 
Health, everyone has the right to access current medical knowledge regarding prevention 
and treatment and everyone has an equal right to resources to ensure that the same burden 
of disease our generation inherited is not passed on to the next (2011:4). A rights-based 
approach also conflicts with a needs-based approach, where the health problems of a group 
or community is prioritised in order to overcome them in a classic example of utilita-
rianism, but one that is at odds with a key principle of human rights; that rights are 
universal. Pertaining to health care, a rights-based approach would argue that everyone has 
the right to health and that no one has more of a right than another (Beracochea, Evans & 
Weinstein 2011:11).  
Jason Eberl, Eleanor Kinney and Matthew Williams, however, state that the problem 
with the idea of health care as a commodity distributed pursuant to market forces is that, for 
the great majority of people, “many health care services are simply not affordable; and 
while the health insurance market should render access to health care services more 
affordable, the cost of private health insurance remains economically unfeasible for many” 
(2011:551). Whilst the more liberal side of the debate would propose that the government 
should play more of a role in financing and the provision of health care services to ensure 
equal access, the question remains whether there is a middle ground between the notions of 
health care as a right and as a market commodity. The major factor in mitigating a middle 
ground is the obvious need for public subsidies, defrayed by taxpayers, to make 
increasingly costly health care services available to most, if not all, its members. It is also 
noteworthy that there is no developed country in the world in which health care services are 
financed solely by the private funds of patients. Since World War II, most developed 
countries have enacted public programmes of some variation to defray the costs of health 
care for its citizens (Eberl, Kinney & Williams 2011:552). 
The report of the US President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in 
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research (1983), offers such a middle ground, 
which provides sound guidance in addressing health care in trade policy. The report 
concluded that health care was neither a right nor a pure commodity, but something in 
between. The Commission framed its analysis of access to health care “in terms of the 
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special nature of health care and of society’s moral obligation to achieve equity, without 
taking a position on whether the term ‘obligation’ should be read as entailing a moral 
right,” and defined “equitable access to health care” as requiring that “all citizens be able to 
secure an adequate level of care without excessive burdens”; and it concluded that “society 
has an ethical obligation to ensure equitable access to health care for all” because of the 
“special importance of health care” (Eberl, Kinney & Williams 2011:552-553). In addition, 
the Commission determined that the societal obligation is balanced by individual 
obligations and described the content of an individual’s obligations:  
Individuals ought to pay a fair share of their health care cost and take reasonable steps to 
provide for such care when they can do so without excessive burdens. Nevertheless, the 
origins of health needs are too complex, and their manifestations too acute and severe, to 
permit care to be regularly denied on the grounds that individuals are solely responsible 
for their own health (Eberl, Kinney & Williams 2011:553). 
If the right to health care is viewed as a right to equality of opportunity, denying any person 
health care would be to restrict the range of opportunities that would otherwise be open to 
that individual. Other issues, such as the distribution of wealth and income, however, also 
greatly influence the equality of opportunity to which a person would have access (Daniels 
2001:319). 
Norman Daniels comes to the conclusion that a right to health care is important, but that 
it can, and should, be restricted and that not every medical need gives rise to an entitlement 
to services. He states that we cannot make the direct conclusion that because an individual 
has a right to health care, it automatically means that he or she should be entitled to some 
precise health-care service, even if it is a health-care need (2001:320-321). Onora O’Neill, 
as Kristen Hessler indicates, further emphasises that a right to universal health cannot be 
provided. The reasons he gives for this statement is that, in the first instance, universal 
health cannot be achieved, as total dedication to others’ health or even always prioritising 
health improvements over other action is unachievable. In the second instance, since health 
is not a commodity that can be distributed, universal health is unachievable (2008:40).  
A notion that does not feature in many of these debates is the concept of human dignity. 
This concept can also serve as a basis for the human right to health in view of bio-
technological advances like HE, especially in Christian bioethical dicourse. 
 
Human Dignity  
The conviction that all human beings have inherent value and dignity, simply on the basis 
that they are human, is more often than not grounded in the confession that they are created 
imago Dei, in the image of God, in Christian thought. 
“Wherever there came to be a concept of ‘the human being’, the right of human beings 
as such were formulated too”. This means that human rights are not explicitly Christian or 
European, although it was formulated as such during the time of the Western Enlighten-
ment and made its way into constitutions in that form (Moltmann 1999:117). Jürgen 
Moltmann sees the need for human rights to expand in two directions: firstly, in the formu-
lation of the fundamental rights of humanity and secondly, by incorporating human rights 
into the rights of the earth and all other living things (1999:118). 
Human dignity is both the root of human rights and the bond unifying different cate-
gories of rights, be they protective rights, the rights to freedom, social rights or rights of 
participation (Moltmann 1999:119). Moltmann clarifies that human dignity is not the 
elevation of human beings above other living things and cannot be upheld at the expense of 
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nature (1999:120). Individual and social rights also belong together and one cannot take 
precedence over the other (Moltmann 1999:123-124). Moltmann explains it in the 
following way: 
The fact that all human beings are made in the image of God is the foundation of human 
dignity. Human beings are intended to live in this relation to God. That gives their 
existence its inalienable, transcendent depth dimension. In their relationship to the 
transcendent God, human beings become persons whose dignity must not be infringed 
(Moltmann 1999:122). 
For the Christian ethical discussion on HGE, this would mean that human dignity, as hu-
manity created imago Dei must be respected, and that this dignity should not infringe on the 
created dignity of nature and other living things. Respecting human dignity could be 
interpreted in some circles as respecting the human genome as it exists in nature and that 
any interference would be a violation of the human dignity of the individual involved.  
I disagree with this type of discourse, however, and instead deem it a breach of the 
human dignity of the affected individual when the technology exists that is able to repair 
genetic defects or heal a crippling hereditary disease. Respecting the human dignity of that 
individual, which includes the right to a life of dignity may very well rather mean offering 
him or her every chance at a life of dignity, even when that should be materialised  through 
biotechnological intervention. In this instance, a distinction must be made between the 
utilisation of genetic intervention for enhancement and for healing or curing purposes, 
although the complexity of this distinction6 is realised.  
The right to lead a life of dignity is also an inherent part of human dignity (Moltmann 
1999:127). For this reason, the bigger issue of economic injustice should be addressed. 
Relating closely to this, Maura Ryan rightly indicates that in many regions access to basic 
health care, clean water, satisfactory nourishment, maternal and child care and the treatment 
and prevention of HIV/AIDS, are far more serious crises than the availability of genetic 
treatments (2012:974-975).  
For this reason, I raise the larger issue of socio-economic justice and not simply the 
issues with which the conversation on social justice confronts HGE directly,  such as the 
inequality that would exist in access and affordability. Given the large discrepancies that 
exist in the health care sector at present, these concerns can very easily be argued away. In 
this regard, one can simply state that the social injustices that they refer to are present in 
any case and that it does not contribute in a unique way to the Christian bioethical 
discussion on HGE. Arguing in this way, without taking the broader socio-economic 
context into account, could lead one to making the case that because the inequalities that 
these forms of biotechnologies could exacerbate exist already, it does not add anything 
original to the bioethical discourse. 
 
Human Genetic Engineering and South African Inequalities in Health Care 
It has already been established that great divides exist in the South African context, also in 
terms of health care. This also then raises questions regarding the aspect of social justice 
when it comes to the utilisation of HE. 
                                                
6  Some scholars, such as for example James Peterson (2012:970-971); Michael Sandel (2007:49) and Gerald 
McKenny (1997:32-37) argue that this is an impossible distinction to make. Others maintain that to a certain 
extent, these concepts can indeed be distinguished, of which Allen Buchanan (2011) and Nicholas Agar 
(2010:17) are noteworthy examples. 
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The first argument levelled against the use of HGE in the context of the existing 
inequalities is the possibility that those who can afford to utilise this biotechnology would 
be able to prevent certain diseases in their children, leading to the risk of empathy and 
concern for these diseases disappearing and turning them into ‘low-class' diseases. 
Furthermore, if illness is thought of as something avoidable, it could also mean that social 
provision and care for the sick might be reduced (Gavaghan 2007:172-175). Maura Ryan 
indicates that high-demand genetic therapies such as GE “are likely to be both very costly 
and (as in vitro fertilization and other reproductive technologies) available only to those 
who are willing and able to pay for them” (2012:977). 
In Our Posthuman Future, Francis Fukuyama further states: “If wealthy parents 
suddenly have open to them the opportunity to increase the intelligence of their children as 
well as that of all their subsequent descendants, then we have the markings not just of a 
moral dilemma but of a full-scale class war” (2002:16). This possibility, of course, also 
raises significant questions for theological ethics, especially with regards to the previous 
section on human dignity. If all people are born equally with inherent dignity because they 
are created imago Dei, what implications could this possible genetic divide have? 
In addition, HGE can also be viewed in terms of power, especially given the reality that 
only a small percentage of the population would be able to afford and access this 
biotechnology; in short, only the powerful. In Theology and Biotechnology, Cynthia Deane-
Drummond refers to the power that is wielded by biotechnology in the agricultural sphere 
as “becoming a means of oppressing Third World economies and [it] seems to drive a 
wedge between rich and poor nations” (1997:82). As a result, the long term social con-
sequences have to be taken into consideration. This also confirms that the issue under 
discussion is much wider and more extensive than simply the right to health care and one 
that also touches on larger discourses of social justice and human dignity – also from a 
theological perspective. 
Colin Gavaghan sums up the issue at hand: the fear is that unequal access to this kind of 
technology could cause or exacerbate pre-existing divisions (2007:172). This is a fear that, 
given the reality of inequalities and the ever-growing divide between the rich and poor in 
South Africa, does not seem to be unfounded. 
 
Conclusion 
It has been indicated that health care plays a lesser part in determining a person’s health. In 
this article I have argued that in the human rights discourse, the human right to health 
should be emphasised rather than simply the right to health care. This does not mean, 
however, that health care should not be included in this right, or that a government have 
any less of a duty to look after the health of its people. On the contrary, it is my opinion that 
by viewing the right to health as much more than merely the right to have access to health 
care services, a much more holistic view of human health care is at work, one that also puts 
emphasis on the numerous other features that contribute to health, for example sanitation, 
housing, diet, and so forth, and appeals to the responsibility of government to look after 
these basic human needs of those who cannot afford to do so themselves. In addition, by 
accentuating the larger issue of social justice and not simply the matter of access and 
availability that is directly related to HGE, this article also dealt with the much larger issue 
of socio-economic justice. 
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This, of course, also has extensive and far-reaching implications for the larger dis-
cussion on HGE and the impact it would have on the current South African context, with its 
great and growing gap between rich and poor, or, in other words, between those who would 
be able to afford this technology, and those who would not have access, were HGE to 
become commercially available. This is not to say that this biotechnology should not be 
used for curing and treatment purposes, but rather stresses that social justice be underlined 
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